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Abstract 
This paper provides a pragmatic analysis of some human-computer conversations carried 
out during the past six years within the context of the Loebner Prize Contest, an annual com- 
petition in which computers participate in Turing Tests. The Turing Test posits that to be 
granted intelligence, a computer should imitate human conversational behavior so well as to 
be indistinguishable from a real human being. We carried out an empirical study exploring 
the relationship between computers’ violations of Grice’s cooperative principle and conver- 
sational maxims, and their success in imitating human language use. Based on conversation 
analysis and a large survey, we found that different maxims have different effects when vio- 
lated, but more often than not, when computers violate the maxims, they reveal their identity. 
The results indicate that Grice’s cooperative principle is at work during conversations with 
computers. On the other hand, studying human-computer communication may require some 
modifications of existing frameworks in pragmatics because of certain characteristics of these 
conversational environments. Pragmatics constitutes a serious challenge to computational lin- 
guistics. While existing programs have other significant shortcomings, it may be that the 
biggest hurdle in developing computer programs which can successfully carry out conversa- 
tions will be modeling the ability to ‘cooperate’. 0 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
The Imitation Game (IG), better known as the Turing Test (IT), was introduced 
in 1950 by Alan Turing as a means to detect whether a computer possesses intel- 
ligence. 
Turing believed that a way to objectively assess machine mentality was needed, 
for he thought the question ‘Can machines think?’ was too ambiguous. He attempted 
to transform this question into a more concrete form: the IG is played with a man 
(A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) whose gender is unimportant. The inter- 
rogator stays in a room apart from A and B. The objective of the interrogator is to 
determine which of the other two is the woman while the objective of both the man 
and the woman is to convince the interrogator that he/she is the woman and the other 
is not. The players communicate through a teletype connection, thus in written nat- 
ural language. Conversation topics can be on any subject imaginable, from mathe- 
matics to poetry, from the weather to chess. 
According to Turing, the new question to be discussed, instead of the equivocal 
‘Can machines think? ‘, can be ‘What will happen when a machine takes the part of 
A in this game? Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is 
played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman?’ 
At a later point in the paper, however, Turing replaces the question ‘Can 
machines think? ’ by the following: 
“Let us fix our attention to one particular digital computer C. Is it true that by modifying this computer 
to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action and providing it with an appropriate 
programme, C can be made to play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being 
taken by a man?” (Turing, 1950: 442, emphasis added). 
Notice that the woman has disappeared altogether. But the objectives of A, B and 
the interrogator remain unaltered; at least Turing does not explicitly state any 
change. In this version, a man and a computer program are playing the game and try- 
ing to convince the judge that they are women. 
As it is now generally understood, what the ‘IT tries to assess is the machine’s 
ability to imitate a human being, rather than its ability to simulate a woman. Most 
subsequent work on the TT ignores the gender issue and assumes that the game is 
played between a machine (A), a human (B) and an interrogator (C). In this version, 
C’s aim is to determine which one of the two entities he/she is conversing with is the 
human. 
Although it is not clear why Turing introduces the gender-based IG, given that he 
was interested in whether or not machines can think, we have argued elsewhere that 
Turing’s original game constitutes a controlled experimental design (Saygin, 1999; 
Saygin et al., 2000). It provides a fair basis for comparison: the woman (either as a 
participant in the game or as a concept) acts as a neutral point so that the two play- 
ers can be assessed in how well they imitate something which they are not. Philoso- 
phers also commented on the gender-based IG (see Piccinini, 2000; Sterrett, 2000; 
Traiger, 2000, for a recent discussion). We will return to a discussion of the original 
gender-based game later. Unless noted otherwise, when talking about the TT, we 
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will be referring to the game in which the decision to be made is one of ‘species’ 
(human vs. machine), not gender. 
Much has been written on the TT, with many authors discussing its implications 
for artificial intelligence (AI). Most works attack or defend the validity of the test as 
a means to grant intelligence to machines. There are many computational analyses, 
an abundance of philosophical comments, and occasional remarks from other disci- 
plines such as psychology and sociology. A detailed survey of the ‘IT can be found 
in Saygin et al. (2000). 
The TT has never been carried out exactly as Turing described it. However, there 
are variants of the original IT in which computer programs participate and show 
their skills in ‘humanness’. Since 1991, Hugh Loebner has been organizing the so- 
called annual Loebner Prize Competition. Participating computer programs try to 
convince judges that they are human. One or more human confederates also partici- 
pate and try to aid the judges in identifying the humans. The judges also rank the 
participants with respect o their ‘human-ness’. Although no program has passed the 
‘IT so far, the quality of participating programs seems to be increasing every year. 
The year 2000 marked the fiftieth year of the IT. While many conversation sys- 
tems, or ‘chatterbots’, have been developed, none exhibit human-like conversational 
behavior to the extent that they can pass the TT. We believe it is time we analyze 
some recent programs within the context of pragmatics and see how, at the turn of 
the millennium, computers are doing as conversational partners. We will not be con- 
cerned with whether passing the test implies the machine is intelligent or with 
related theoretical issues. Here, we take official, real, human-computer conversations 
and use them in a study in which subjects were asked to read and make pragmatic 
judgments about them. We then analyze the results both in terms of human behavior 
in conversations with computers and in terms of better program design. 
We focus on one particular aspect of conversation and attempt o explore it in 
relation to the ‘IT. This aspect is Grice’s cooperative principle (CP) and conversa- 
tional maxims. Just as Turing’s TT is a milestone in AI, Grice’s theory has been very 
influential in the field of pragmatics. The powerful juxtaposition of these two con- 
cepts is thus a significant component of this study. Pragmatics, in a nutshell, is con- 
cerned with language in use. The TT stipulates a criterion on machine intelligence 
based on the way computers use language. What could be more natural than the 
bringing together of these two concepts in analyzing human-computer communica- 
tion in natural anguage? We believe a pragmatic approach to the TT reveals a lot of 
important issues that are easy to miss otherwise. Through a pragmatic analysis, we 
can gain valuable insights on what it means to have a human-like conversation and 
what principles, implicitly or explicitly, guide human-computer conversation. In this 
paper, we study how humans behave in relation to the CP and the conversational 
maxims: we analyze human-computer conversations and we quantify the relation- 
ships between performance in ‘ITS and judgments of maxim violations. 
In this paper, IT transcripts are studied as exemplars of human-computer conversa- 
tion. We used a selected set of conversation excerpts from Loebner contest ranscripts 
in a pair of questionnaires. Subjects were asked to read the excerpts and to make 
judgments on the computers’ language use, as well as to rate their IT-performance. 
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We sought correlations between computers’ maxim violations and their performance 
in TTs and found some reliable relationships. Violations of maxims often cause 
computers to give away their identity, therefore Grice’s framework seems to be at 
play during conversations with computers. On the other hand, we also observe some 
trends that would not be straightforwardly expected based on Grice’s theory, some- 
thing which indicates that the principles guiding human-computer conversation may 
be slightly different from those guiding inter-human communication. 
Admittedly, TT situations comprise a rather peculiar sort of conversation. For one 
thing, one participant is a computer. Also, the aims of all participants are clearly 
defined and the conversation itself is carried out with a specific purpose. We do not 
see this as a shortcoming of the present work, because we believe that looking into 
highly specialized conversational environments has previously led to interesting 
results in pragmatics research. Moreover, although the conversations we have ana- 
lyzed have been carried out under ‘IT settings, they are surprisingly natural in style 
and content. l 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 very briefly goes over 
Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims. The subject of Section 3 is 
our empirical study on Grice’s conversational maxims and human-computer conver- 
sation. We first explain the methodological choices we made. Then, the aims and the 
design of the study are described. We provide an analysis of some of the conversa- 
tion excerpts used in this study. In Section 4, quantitative results are presented and 
discussed in two steps. First, the analysis is carried out within each conversation, 
then a general relationship between maxim violations and computers’ performance is 
quantified using data from all conversations. The section also includes a discussion 
of the effects of bias on the results. The results provided constitute the basis for a 
more general analysis of human-computer conversation, given in Section 5. Here, we 
list some practical concerns in human-computer communication, emphasize further 
the importance of bias, and reconsider the cooperative principle within the context of 
the TT. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Conversation and conversational maxims 
In pragmatics, there are an abundance of principles and maxims. In fact it has 
been said that “one uses rules in syntax, but principles in pragmatics” (Leech, 1983). 
The difference is not only at the level of terminology: principles and maxims, unlike 
I For instance, it could be expected that the exchange between the parties will take the form of an 
‘interrogation’. In reality, few human judges who participate in the Loebner contest ask previously 
planned questions designed to make the computer give away its identity. Even with poorly designed 
programs, many judges attempt o carry out conversations of the sort humans have with each other, ask- 
ing about home towns, family, hobbies, and so on. The interested reader is referred to the Loebner Prize 
homepage at http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html, where most contest transcripts are 
available. 
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rules, are not absolute or predictive. Speakers are not required to abide by them, the 
hearers are not guaranteed to interpret utterances according to them. 
Clearly, a conversation involves more than one entity. For there to be some com- 
munication, there must be at least two entities who have knowledge of the same lan- 
guage and the means to carry out a conversation. But there are also some principles 
and maxims that characterize meaningful conversations. Philosopher Paul Grice first 
introduced the cooperative principle in 1967: 
CP “Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it is 
required, by the accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged.” (Grice, 1975: 47) 
The CP consists of four sub-principles, usually referred to as the conversational 
maxims. These are called the maxims of quality, quantity, relevance and manner 
(Henceforth, QL, QN, RL and MN, respectively) (Grice, 1975: 47-48): 
RL Be relevant. 
QN Do not make your contribution less or more informative than is required. 
QL Try to make your contribution one that is true: Do not say what you believe 
to be false; do not say that for which you lack adequate vidence. 
MN Be perspicuous: Avoid obscurity of expression; avoid ambiguity; be brief; be 
orderly.2 
Grice views talking “as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, 
behavior” (Grice, 1975: 48). This does not imply that maxim violators are always 
irrational, but it should be apparent hat without any adherence to the conversational 
maxims, there would not be much communication. We agree with what Grice has to 
say about this: “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is 
just a well-recognized empirical fact that people do behave in these ways; they 
learned to do so in childhood and have not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it 
would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit” 
(Grice, 1975: 49). Therefore, it is reasonable to think that humans may implicitly be 
making use of the CP and the maxims throughout he conversations that we will be 
analyzing. We put this hypothesis to test in our empirical study. 
3. Methods 
In this section, we describe the empirical 
human-computer conversations. We chose to 
puts it: 
part of our analysis of pragmatics of 
study the maxims because, as Keenan 
* In this study, the maxim of ‘politeness’, which Grice originally listed under other factors that are at 
play, is considered to fall under the maxim of manner. 
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“Grice does offer a framework in which the conversational principles of different speech communities 
can be compared. We can, in theory, take any one maxim and note when it does or does not hold. The 
motivation for its use and abuse may reveal values and orientations that separate one society from 
another (e.g. men, women, kinsmen, strangers) within a single society.” (Keenan, 1976) 
The maxims can be, and have been, used in the way described by Keenan above. 
Our approach is to consider computers as language users and thereby to try to reach 
conclusions about what does and does not govern human-computer conversations. 
We therefore not only analyze how computer programs today handle pragmatics, but 
also hope to gain insights into the pragmatic dynamics of ‘IT situations. 
The TT is one of the oldest and most disputed topics in Artificial Intelligence. 
Grice’s CP and conversational maxims are equally important issues in pragmatics. 
The juxtaposition of these two concepts is a powerful idea with many possible impli- 
cations. However, both the ‘IT and pragmatics are areas on which it is difficult to do 
applied work. Most work on the TT (see Saygin et al., 2000) has been philosophical. 
Pragmatics research has many philosophical aspects, along with linguistic ones. 
Moreover, pragmatics being the ‘wastebasket’ of linguistics, most issues that it is 
concerned with are difficult to formalize. 
Conversational analysis (CA) is one of the most preferred approaches for inquir- 
ing into pragmatic phenomena. The CA approach considers language, and in partic- 
ular conversation, as a social activity. It is inductive and data-driven (Mey, 1993: 
195). Typically the data used in CA are actual pieces of language as used by speak- 
ers. Practically any real life linguistic exchange, from telephone conversations to 
Internet-based chat transcripts, can be and have been studied with CA. In our work, 
we have utilized CA to analyze some conversations taken from Loebner contest ran- 
scripts. These conversations constitute an excellent source for analyzing state-of-the- 
art computer programs in real conversations with humans. Abundant information on 
CA can be found in Sacks (1992). 
Another very well-known method, especially in social science research, is con- 
ducting surveys. Surveys can take the form of in-depth interviews and observations, 
although most of the time, they involve questionnaires. When appropriate, surveys 
are a good way to test hypotheses or to locate causes of certain phenomena. 
Our aim in this study, in a nutshell, was to look at the relationship between the 
conversational maxims and the success of computers in displaying human-like con- 
versational behavior. A natural choice was to conduct a survey and have some 
human-computer conversations (which were previously analyzed via CA) interpreted 
by subjects along these dimensions. 
3.1. Aims 
The study aims to detect how computers’ violation of the maxims affects their 
success in carrying out conversations with humans. The design of the survey, which 
is explained in detail in Section 3.2, enables us to infer supplementary results. For 
instance, due to the fact that we can use each group of subjects as controls for the 
other, we can examine the (two-fold) effect of bias in maxim detections and perfor- 
mance decisions. 
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The survey results are used to determine what effects the violation of each maxim 
has. We also quantify how predictive maxim violations are for the performance mea- 
sures. Although formalizations of pragmatic phenomena re very difficult, we hope 
that the results of this survey will provide a direction as to how to handle some prob- 
lems with conversational planning in the design of new conversation programs, and 
in general, natural anguage conversation systems. They also provide a basis for the 
pragmatic analysis of human-computer conversation. 
3.2. Design 
3.2.1. Items 
The items used in the questionnaires were human-computer conversation excerpts 
taken from Loebner Contest transcripts from the years 1994-1999. This, we believe, 
was the only rational alternative for our purposes because these transcripts are the 
only examples of publicly available real-time human-computer conversations. The 
fact that they are recent is also important, since we would like to reach conclusions 
about the state of the art and propose future directions. 
3.2.2. Groups 
As we briefly mentioned before, we are interested in determining the relationship 
between two phenomena: the conversational maxims and performance in a TT. We 
chose to let the subjects judge both of these. This brought some extra constraints into 
the design. 
We decided that we would have two groups and two questionnaires, thereby hav- 
ing a within-subjects and between-subjects design. The advantages of such a design 
were manifold. The groups would act as controls to each other. We would get the 
chance to not only look at the relationship between the maxims and performance 
assessments, but also study the effects of bias on these. In other words, we would be 
able to see whether having knowledge about the computers’ participation in the con- 
versations has a noticeable effect on how people detect maxim violations, and 
whether having had an unbiased exposure to the conversations would affect the per- 
formance judgments when the information about computers was provided afterwards. 
There were two questionnaires, one testing for maxim violations and one asking 
for m-judgments. We refer to those as QMAX and Q2TT, respectively. We divided 
our subjects into two groups: Group A denotes the subjects who took QMAX first 
and Ql’T second, while Group B denotes those who took them in the opposite order. 
Therefore, subjects in Group A are unbiased in QMAX and those in Group B are 
unbiased in QTT. 
A third group of subjects participated in preliminary open-ended surveys which 
asked for opinions on items that were to be used. The results of these surveys were 
utilized to develop the multiple choice questions in QMAX and QTT. 
3.2.3. Subjects 
Preliminary open-ended surveys were completed by 10 adults who were students 
and faculty in English Language and Literature. 
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The subjects who took the multiple-choice questionnaires (QMAX and QlT) 
were 87 adults, ages ranging from 18 to 61.45% of the subjects were male and 55% 
were female. 25.3% of the participants had completed graduate school, 28.7% were 
graduate students, 3 1% had completed university, 12.6% were university students 
and 2.3% had completed high school. 10.3% of the people who took the question- 
naires were native speakers of English. 96.5% indicated they regularly read 
books/magazines in English, and 91.8% indicated they regularly watched movies/TV 
shows in English. 100% of the subjects had had all or part of their education in 
English. 
While the subjects were divided into two groups (44 of them were placed in 
Group A and 43 of them in Group B), care was taken that they were uniformly dis- 
tributed with respect to gender, level of education and familiarity with the English 
language. 
We would like to note here that having a good understanding of colloquial Eng- 
lish was an important prerequisite for being a subject. However, being a native 
speaker of the language was not required. This is not a requirement stated by Turing 
(1950) or elsewhere. In the Loebner contest too, some judges and confederates have 
been non-native speakers of English. We believe the fact that only 10% of the sub- 
jects are native speakers of English does not invalidate our results. We would, how- 
ever, wish to replicate the experiment with native speakers o as to see whether there 
is a variation between the current results and theirs, although we do not think there 
would be a significant difference. 
3.2.4. Questionnaires 
In choosing which excerpts to use in this study, we had two main concerns: 
(1) The excerpts should be interpretable as conversations between two entities. 
(2) Some excerpts should include violations of the conversational maxims as 
detemined via CA. 
In (l), by ‘interpretable as conversations’ we mean that the computers’ utter- 
ances should, at least syntactically, be similar to sentences one would encounter in 
a normal conversation. Many people who are not active in artificial intelligence or 
natural language processing research are not aware that even the best conversation 
programs developed thus far are rather poor users of language. For a review, the 
reader is referred to Saygin et al. (2000) and the references provided therein. Here, 
we want to study the pragmatic issues in human-computer communication. If we 
had included several conversations with syntactic problems, this would shed no 
light on our main question. In that case, it would not be possible to know what was 
really behind the results: the syntactic problems in the conversations, or the prag- 
matic phenomena we are testing for. (2) is a direct consequence of the aims of this 
experiment. 
The questionnaires were in multiple choice format. Preliminary surveys were 
given to a separate group of subjects in order to come up with the multiple choice 
entries. Fig. 1 shows the format of the questions in QMAX and QTT. 
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QMAX intends to ask whether the conversational maxims are violated in the con- 
versation excerpts provided. It is natural that the choices should correspond to the 
descriptions of the maxims. However, a preliminary open-ended questionnaire was 
given to 4 subjects. They were provided with 8 of the 14 conversation excerpts that 
were used in QMAX and QTT and asked to write about what, if anything, was 
wrong with the conversations and to indicate any communication problems they 
could detect. The answers they wrote were in high correlation with the maxims’ 
descriptions so we deduced it was indeed proper to use those as the choices in 
QMAX. Moreover, this correlation was indicative of the appropriateness of the con- 
versation excerpts to our task. (A sample response to this open-ended survey can be 
found in Saygin, 1999). 
In Q’IT, we not only wanted to ask whether the subjects thought the computer in 
each conversation was successful in imitating human linguistic behavior, but also to 
ask for some more information about the computer’s general behavior. These ques- 
tions, we hoped, would shed light on why the subjects decide in the way they do. But 
it would be inappropriate and misleading to give them choices that we formulated. 6 
subjects were asked to make open-ended comments on the computers’ behavior in 
the same 8 excerpts. Their answers were analyzed and formulated into 11 choices 
that QlT-takers would be able to mark. 
3.3. Conversation excerpts 
14 conversation excerpts selected from previous Loebner Contest transcripts were 
used in this study. In this section, we present and briefly analyze (via CA) 8 of the 
14 conversations that were used. The full list of excerpts used in this survey can be 
found in Saygin (1999). 
Note that in our analyses we cannot be totally objective since we know the iden- 
tities of the participants and the situations in which these conversations took place. 
The statements we make on which maxims are violated are to be taken as our own 
judgments. Perhaps they can be regarded as hypotheses. We look at what the sub- 
jects said about these in later sections. We present these conversations o that the 
reader will be acquainted with them and will get more out of the results we present 
below. In all conversations, the computers’ contributions are in italics. 
Conversation 1 
A: I never stole nothing in my life. But they always blame the cleaners when any- 
thing is missing. 
B: How could you steal? Does your uniform even have pockets? 
A: Goddamn it! I already told you I didn’t take it. You think I am a liar, too? 
B: No no no no! ! ! ! I meant, I didn’t think you even could steal. How would you 
get a radio out? 
A: You? Don’t jerk me around. I didn’t see nobody. Except the professor who 
works in the lab. 
236 A.P. Saygin, I. Cicekli I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 227-258 
QM 
Conversation N 
Agree Neutral or Does Disagrti 
Not Apply 
A’s contribution to the conversation is irrelevant, 
B’s contribution to the conversation is irrelevant. 
A provides significantly more or less information than required. 
B provides significantly more or less information than required. 
A says things that are false or things that he/she lacks adequate 
evidence for. 
B says things that are false or things that he/she lacks adequate 
evidence for. 
A is ambiguous, obscure, rude, over-reactive; or displays other- 
wise inappropriate behavior. 
B is ambiguous, obscure, rude, over-reactive; or displays other- 
wise inappropriate behavior. I I I 
Qm 
Conversation N - X is the computer 
IPart 1 Agree 1 Neutral 1 Disagree1 
The computer’s behavior in this excerpt is ‘human-like’. 
The computer’s behavior in this excerpt reveals the fact that it is 
a machine. 
Part 2: Please check all that apply 
The computer gives irrelevant responses. 
The computer doesn’t understand the questions. 
The computer says things that are false. 
The computer’s use of language creates an ‘artificial’ effect. 
The computer’s use of language creates a ‘human’ effect. 
The computer displays emotions. 
The computer’s behavior (use of language or emotions) is inappropriate. 
The computer provides less information than required. 
The computer provides more information than required. 
The computer fails to get a joke. 
The computer makes an appropriate joke. 
Fig. 1: Question Format of QMAX and QlT 
Conversation 2 
A: You’re a cleaner? 
B: Yeah? You think I’m a thief, too? You’re no better than the rest of them. Leave 
me alone, asshole. 
A: Asshole? 
B: I don’t know. 
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A: You called me an asshole? 
B: Huh? 
A: Don’t you have manners? You don’t even know me and you’re calling me a bad 
name. 
Conversations 1 and 2 involve the same computer program, but different judges. 
These conversations are examples of the maxim MN being violated by the com- 
puter. The program displays unnecessarily rude and paranoid behavior in both 
conversations. 
In Conversation 1, B actually attempts to empathize with A. A becomes overly 
paranoid and starts talking in a rather impolite manner (‘Goddamn it! . . . ‘). Even 
after B clarifies what he/she meant in case there was a misunderstanding, A contin- 
ues in a similar fashion (‘Don’t jerk me around . ..‘). A appears as though he/she/it 
is overly sensitive about the theft issue. 
Although MN is violated, the conversation is coherent. Since A is a computer pro- 
gram, we cannot really say that QL is violated (even though it obviously did not steal 
the radio). RL is not violated either; both the interrogator and the computer are talk- 
ing about theft. And finally, A does not answer B’s question (‘Does your uniform 
even have pockets? ‘) and therefore we may say, provides less information than 
required. But a closer look shows that, B is not really asking a question (‘I meant, I
didn’t think you even could steal.‘). QN is not really violated in this excerpt, because 
B is not actually asking for information. 
Conversation 2 is also one in which the computer is behaving in a highly inap- 
propriate way and violates MN. In fact, A notices this and voices his/her opinions 
about it. There is a difference between this conversation and Conversation 1. There 
is a change in B’s attitude in its second and third contributions (‘I don’t know’ and 
‘Huh? ‘). It is not easy to explain this change; it could be interpreted as a violation 
of RL or QN since B refuses to respond to A’s confrontation. On the other hand, B 
is to some extent ‘correcting’ its mistake by not continuing in an inappropriate man- 
ner. However, we can still say, with a great deal of confidence, that MN is violated 
since B uses a swear word without A triggering such a rude reaction. 
Conversation 3 
A: What part of the country are you from? 
B: I come from Perth, which is in Western Australia. 
A: Western Australia occupies the entire western third of the country, bordered by 
the Indian Ocean to the west, South Australia and the Northern Territory to the 
east, the Timor Sea to the north, and the Southern Ocean to the south. 
Conversation 4 
A: Are you a man or a woman? 
B: Fine, thanks for talking. 
A: So, what is your name? 
B: I’ll never tell. 
A: Why? 
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B : Why what? 
A: Why won’t you tell me your name? 
B : I couldn ‘t say. 
We will study the maxim of QN by considering its submaxims eparately. Here, 
QNl denotes the maxim ‘do not provide less information than required’, and QN2 
denotes ‘do not provide more information than required’. 
Conversation 3 is an example of a case in which the computer violates QN2. B 
merely states where he/she lives and A replies in a rather mechanical manner, citing 
geographical data. RL and QL are not violated since the information provided is 
about Perth, and is correct. 
In Conversation 4, B’s behavior is rather vague and obscure; we may say that MN 
is violated. Also, B opts out and thereby violates QNl. From the exchange, it can be 
inferred that A and B cannot see each other (‘Are you a man or a woman?‘). It 
appears as if B does not want to provide personal information to A. 
Conversation 5 
A: What is the Internet? 
B : It’s that Canadian comedy sketch show where the guys dress up like girls to do 
comedy. 
A: What is the net? 
B: The neutral zone is an area between the Federation and Romulan territory, 
entry into which by either party can be considered an act of war. 
In Conversation 5, B violates QL. This may also be interpreted as RL being vio- 
lated. B answers questions seriously and provides ‘definitions’, which is appropriate 
when asked to define something. However, the definitions are wrong. Theoretically, 
there could exist such a comedy show called the Internet; in this case B’s second 
utterance is still irrelevant. The ‘net’ in A’s second question refers to the Internet. 
Even if B has never heard of the Internet (and therefore does not know that the ‘net’ 
refers to it), he/she/it need not say things for which he/she/it has no adequate vi- 
dence. QL is definitely violated. 
Conversation 6 
A: Can you type any faster? 
B: On the average men can run faster than women, although there are some fine 
women athletes. 
A: Quite true. You make the oddest associations. Sort of like the schizophrenics I 
worked with last summer. 
B : What do you do for a living ? 
B violates RL in Conversation 6. The irrelevance in B’s response does not go 
unnoticed by A (‘you make the oddest associations . . . ‘). 
A.P. Saygin, I. Cicekli I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 227-258 239 
Conversation 7 
A: Eliza was a Greek mathematician. His book ‘The Elements of Geometry’ set 
down how geometry was to be rude. But your grammar processor, I just say 
whatever the hell comes into my head! 
B: Maybe it’s the drugs . . . 
A: An umbrella is a confusing network of passages and winding interconnected 
paths. 
B: But it’s not raining! ! ! 
A: You are soooo predictable it’s not raining! !! 
Conversation 7 is the first of the ‘confusing’ or ‘noisy’ conversations that we 
chose to include. A is not making any sense whatsoever. It is possible to say that all 
maxims are being violated, notably RL and QL. It is not likely that Eliza could be 
the name of a Greek mathematician, or in fact, the name of any male (‘his book . . . ‘). 
The Ancient Greek mathematician Euclid has a book titled ‘Elements’ but he surely 
did not try to show that geometry is rude. The next sentence (‘But your grammar 
. . . ‘) is syntactically and semantically anomalous. The next utterance (‘An umbrella 
. . . ‘) is also irrelevant. On top of all this, in this excerpt, the human judge is not mak- 
ing much sense. All in all, this is a rather problematic talk exchange. 
Conversation 8 
A: Rain is wet. 
B : Rain falls on people. 
A: Are people wet? 
B: Rain is wet. 
A: What happens when rain falls on people? 
B: Rain falls on people. 
The second confusing excerpt is the one provided in Conversation 8. The com- 
puter repeats what is said to it back to the interrogator. It is very difficult to talk 
about a communication in this conversation. RL is not violated; the conversation is 
about rain. QNl is violated by B since he/she/it doesn’t answer the questions in an 
informative manner. 
4. Results 
In this section, we provide the survey results for the conversations given in the 
previous section. Since the maxim violations have already been analyzed by CA, we 
will focus more on the QTT results. From QMAX, we provide only the results per- 
taining to the maxims of interest. The detailed QMAX results for each conversation 
are available in Saygin (1999). 
Before we proceed, it is necessary to explain how the statistics are presented in 
the tables below. Each conversation is summarized in one table that contains the 
distribution of the responses ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’, and ‘Neutral’ within each group. 
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These are denoted A, D and N, under the Answer heading. The headings Human and 
Computer refer to the items in the questionnaire QlT that state ‘the computer’s 
behavior in this excerpt is human-like’ and ‘the computer’s behavior in this excerpt 
reveals the fact that it is a machine’, respectively. Results are presented in percent- 
age format to make the majorities stand out. 
To establish which results are statistically significant, we have used the x2 (chi- 
square) test for independence. We compare each answer pattern (frequency of A, D 
and N responses for each item and group) to the distribution corresponding to chance 
(i.e., where a third of subjects choose each option). When used in this manner the 
test tells us the probability that the distribution of responses we obtained are a 
chance outcome. Therefore, when the probability is low, we may safely infer that the 
direction of the responses (e.g., the outcome that the computer acts human-like in a 
conversation) can be attributed to experimental factors. The degree of freedom for 
each test is two, since we compare two patterns of three cells. The actual value of the 
x2 distribution with two degrees of freedom is given under the column marked x*(~,. 
Finally, the column marked significance provides the p-values associated with each 
x2 value. If the test is not significant beyond 0.05, the test fails and the label ‘n.s’ 
(not significant) is used to denote this finding. As the value of the x2 increases, the 
effects are less likely to be caused by chance and more likely by experimental fac- 
tors (i.e., p-values decrease). 
Table 1 
Results for Conversation 1 
Group Answer Human x2t2, Significance Computer x20, Significance 
A 
B 
A 98% 36.5 p <o.OOOOOO1 0% 31 p < O.OOOOOl 
D 0% 93% 
N 2% 7% 
A 78% 17.2 p < 0.001 19% 6.3 p < 0.05 
D 14% 61% 
N 1% 20% 
Table 2 
Results for Conversation 2 
Group Answer Human x2c2, Significance Computer x2c2, Significance 
A A 75% 16.1 p < 0.001 17% 5.0 n.s. 
D 20% 58% 
N 5% 25% 
B A 63% 9.4 p < 0.01 29% 2.3 ns. 
D 27% 49% 
N 10% 22% 
Let us consider Conversations 1 and 2. QMAX results indicate that 82% of all 
subjects think that the computer has violated MN in Conversation 1. For Conversa- 
tion 2, the percentage is even higher, at 93%. These results support our conversation 
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analysis. In addition, it was seen that in Conversation 2, more subjects seem to think 
that RL and QN are violated than in Conversation 1. 
The results of QTT are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Looking at the per- 
centages, both groups in both conversations thought that the computers behaved in a 
human-like manner and that they did not reveal their identity. For Conversation 1, 
98% of Group A subjects agreed that the computer appeared human-like and no sub- 
ject disagreed. The human-like appearance is more visibly supported by subjects in 
both groups for Conversation 1. The trends are all significant for Conversation 1, 
however responses did not reach significance for the ‘revealing machine-ness’ item 
in Conversation 2. In all tests, Group A subjects seem to support their views more 
strongly; the p-values are all lower. 
The results for Conversations 1 and 2 indicate that strong violations of MN, in the 
absence of violations of other maxims, led to a favorable assessment of the comput- 
ers’ TT success. 
Table 3 
Results for Conversation 3 
Group Answer Human x20, Significance Computer x20, Significance 
A A 10% 21.7 p < 0.0001 70% 10.9 p < 0.01 
D 83% 12% 
N 7% 17% 
B A 15% 13.1 p < 0.01 69% 10.1 p < 0.01 
D 73% 15% 
N 12% 17% 
Table 4 
Results for Conversation 4 
Group Answer Human X2(2, significance Computer X2P, Significance 
A A 36% 0.2 n.s. 36% 0.2 ns. 
D 36% 36% 
N 28% 28% 
B A 35% 0.4 n.s. 35% 0.4 n.s. 
D 28% 37% 
N 37% 28% 
Now we look at Conversations 3 and 4, in which we hypothesized that QN was 
being violated. These violations were indeed detected by our subjects (93% for Con- 
versation 3 and 74% for Conversation 4). Table 3 depicts the questionnaire results 
for Conversation 3. Table 3 suggests that the violation has a negative effect on the 
computer’s ‘IT performance, with only 10% of Group A and 15% of Group B mem- 
bers agreeing that the computer’s behavior is human-like. Moreover, the x2 test 
yields significant results for both groups and items. 
The results are not as striking for violations of QNl, as is the case in Conversa- 
tion 4. The subjects detected the violation of QN, however, they also reported 
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noticeable percentages of RI_. and MN violations (45% and 60%, respectively). 
Table 4 gives the QTT results for Conversation 4. The distribution of responses 
come too close to a chance distribution to be considered meaningful. The x2 tests are 
not even close to significance. 
The results indicate a correlation between violations of QN2 and creating a 
machine-like impression. No such relationship can be inferred for QNl based on this 
study; this may be due to other factors, such as a higher agreement with the viola- 
tion of MN in conversations in which QNl violations were present. 
Table 5 
Results for Conversation 5 
Group Answer Human significance Computer Significance 
A A 15% 8.2 p < 0.05 60% 5.8 Il.% 
D 65% 20% 
N 20% 20% 
B A 17% 10.1 p < 0.01 63% 8.4 p < 0.05 
D 68% 12% 
N 15% 25% 
Moving on to Conversation 5, in which we claimed that QL was violated, it was 
found in QMAX that subjects did not fail to notice the violation (84%). However, 
the responses for RL and QN were also very high, reported by 70% and 65% of sub- 
jects, respectively. 
As can be seen in Table 5, the results of QT’T for Conversation 5 indicate that the 
computer’s TT performance is rather poor. Only 15% of Group A subjects and 17% 
of Group B subjects believe that the computer’s behavior is human-like. The inde- 
pendence tests do not yield as high x2 values as some others. Nevertheless, all but 
one reach significance. However, the results cannot be directly associated with the 
QL violations in this excerpt, for other maxims are violated as well. 
Table 6 
Results for Conversation 6 
Group Answer Human x2(21 Significance Computer x2<*, Significance 
A 
B 
7% 
78% 
15% 
12% 
76% 
12% 
16.3 p < 0.001 78% 16.3 p < 0.001 
15% 
7% 
14.8 p<O.ool 78% 17.2 p < 0.001 
7% 
15% 
In Conversation 6, we had hypothesized that RI_ is violated by the computer. The 
survey validates this hypothesis ince 88% of subjects also detected the violation. The 
QTT results for this conversation are given in Table 6. The results of the questionnaires 
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indicate that the computer’s irrelevant responses have noticeably negative effects on 
its TT performance. All independence tests reach significance beyond 0.001. 
Let us now consider Conversations 7 and 8. QMAX results show that almost all 
maxims are violated in Conversation 7, as we have stated in Section 3.3. RL seems 
to be in the lead (72%), with the others having close percentages of agreement (QN 
at 57%, QL at 53%, and MN at 61%). QL is most definitely violated in this conver- 
sation, but it does not get detected by 47% of the subjects in all the ‘noise’. Table 7 
summarizes the results of QTT for this conversation. The computer cannot manage 
to create a human-like impression. However, due to the fact that almost all maxims 
are being violated by the computer, that its utterances are not grammatical and are 
semantically anomalous and that the judge’s behavior is strange in the given excerpt, 
we cannot reach a clear conclusion. 
It is interesting to note that stronger (negative) results were obtained in much ‘bet- 
ter’ conversations. Here, three of the independence tests are barely significant 
beyond 0.05, while the fourth does not reach significance. We believe these results 
do not indicate that making computer programs incoherent will be a good strategy in 
developing new conversation systems. It merely shows that the subjects’ decision- 
making in this study was affected by the noise in the conversation. 
Table 7 
Results for Conversation 7 
Group Answer Human Significance Computer x2c2, Significance 
A A 15% 6.3 p < 0.05 65% 8.2 p < 0.05 
D 60% 15% 
N 25% 20% 
B A 19% 6.3 p < 0.05 59% 5.3 ns. 
D 61% 22% 
N 20% 19% 
Another problematic exchange is Conversation 8. In this excerpt, it is difficult to 
talk about communication. Subjects managed to detect the violation of QN (69%) 
and to an extent MN (56%). But in a conversation where a participant does not 
answer any of the questions, we would expect QN to be detected by a greater per- 
centage of the subjects. 
Table 8 
Results for Conversation 8 
Group Answer Human x*cz, Significance Computer X2(2, Significance 
A A 10% 15.8 p < 0.001 83% 19.9 p < 0.0001 
D 78% 10% 
N 12% 7% 
B A 10% 12.3 p < 0.01 71% 11.7 p < 0.01 
D 71% 12% 
N 20% 17% 
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When we look at the QTT results in Table 8, we see that the computer gives itself 
away in Conversation 8. All tests reach significance. However, although QN is visi- 
bly violated, we find it inappropriate to say that the QTT results are a direct conse- 
quence of its violation. The conversation is in general so lacking in information that 
the results could be due to anything, including semantic and pragmatic phenomena 
other than maxim violations. An interesting note is that three subjects in Group A, 
independently of each other, wrote a comment under this conversation stating that 
they believed participant B (the computer) was a child. 
4.1. Discussion of maxim violation results 
4.1 .I. Relevance 
The results indicate that RL is a maxim that should not be violated if the human- 
computer conversation is to be satisfactory. When a human violates RL it can be 
interpreted in several ways: He/she may be anxious to change the subject, joking or 
using a metaphor. 
Computers, on the other hand, simply appear as if they do not understand the 
input sentences. In conversations where RL is violated, the subjects who believe that 
the computer’s responses were not relevant also believe that the computer was 
unable to understand the conversation, and vice versa. For example, in Conversation 
5, the RL violation was detected by 71% of subjects, and 79% of subjects (Group A 
and B combined) who thought that the computer’s responses were irrelevant, also 
thought that the computer did not understand the utterances of the other participant. 
Conversely, 87% of subjects who believed the computer did not understand the con- 
versation also indicated that its responses were not relevant. In Conversation 6, 
where 88% of subjects reported the RL violation, it was found that 88% of subjects 
who thought the computer did not understand the utterances also believed its 
responses were irrelevant, and 96% of subjects who believed that the computer did 
not understand the utterances reported the computer’s responses to be irrelevant. 
We believe that current natural anguage conversation programs reveal their iden- 
tity when they violate RL for several reasons, some of which are listed below: 
- They perform little or no semantic processing on the input sentences, 
- They have little or no background knowledge to use in order to ‘understand’ the 
input sentences, 
- As a consequence of the above, they are rather poor in aspects of discourse like 
focus and topic, or in simpler terms, they cannot follow the direction of the con- 
versation. 
4.1.2. Manner 
Violations of MN have a visibly positive effect on imitating human-like behavior. 
The questionnaire results indicate that this is due to ‘displaying emotions’. In some of 
the conversations tudied, the computers displayed impolite, paranoid or over-reactive 
behavior which are normally, albeit not so favorably, associated with humans. 
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There is considerable overlap in subjects’ responses between agreement with the 
computer’s human-like behavior and reporting that the computer displayed emo- 
tions. We provide data for Conversations 1 and 2, for which the violation of MN 
were reported by the subjects. Among subjects who agree that the computer’s 
behavior was human-like, 93% in Conversation 1 and 84% in Conversation 2 also 
indicate that they noticed the computer program displaying emotions. Conversely, 
93% and 80% of subjects who believed the computer displayed emotions in Con- 
versations 1 and 2 (respectively), agreed that the computer behaved in a human-like 
manner. 
It is interesting to note that although subjects detect violations of MN in QMAX, 
fewer subjects make judgments about the appropriateness of the computers’ linguis- 
tic and emotional behavior in QTT. Table 9 summarizes the statistics for this phe- 
nomenon. In this table, the column marked MN in QZT reports the percentage of the 
subjects who indicated they thought the computer was behaving in an inappropriate 
manner in Q’IT. The column MN in QMAX gives the percentages reported for the 
violation of MN in QMAX by the same subjects. The difference between these 
results suggest hat subjects may have a bias caused by the information that the par- 
ticipant whose behavior they are analyzing is a computer program. Subjects seem to 
be less inclined to analyze appropriateness of behavior when they are focused on 
analyzing computers’ performance. The response pattern in the data presented below 
reports a highly significant difference between detection of MN in QMAX and in 
QTT (x*=14.6, p=O.O02). 
Table 9 
Detection of inappropriate manner in the two questionnaires 
Conversation 
1 
2 
Group MN in QMAX MN in QTT 
A 81% 28% 
B 83% 17% 
A 95% 57% 
B 90% 48% 
We saw that violations of RL by the programs tend to create a machine-like effect 
and violations of MN tend to create a human-like effect. In addition, MN has a ‘soft- 
ening’ effect on the TT-decisions when it occurs in conjunction with other maxims, 
including RL. We will analyze multivariate effects in the next section, however we 
present his trend here as well. Fig. 2 demonstrates the relationship between levels of 
agreement with MN and RL violations in Conversations 1, 2 and 6, whose levels of 
MN and RL are presented on the x-axis, respectively. As can be seen, responses 
change as the ratio of MN to RL changes. 
4.1.3. Quantity 
The supermaxim of QN is more informative when separated into its sub-maxims 
of QNl (do not provide less information than required) and QN2 (do not provide 
more information than required). 
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I MN=82%. RL=9% MN=92.5% RLr66.56 MN=27.5% RL=88% 
Fig. 2. Different levels of RL and MN 
We may expect QNl violations to make the computer appear as if it doesn’t 
understand the questions and thereby to create a machine-like appearance. But sur- 
prisingly, the survey results indicate that this is not always true. This is best seen in 
Conversation 4, where the results of Q‘IT are inconclusive. This may be due to the 
evasiveness and obscurity in the computer’s manner, which some subjects may have 
implicitly characterized as human-like behavior. 
QN2 creates a machine-like effect when violated by computers. Conversation 3 
constitutes an example in which the maxim QN2 is violated in isolation so it is pos- 
sible to infer conclusions. The adverse effect of QN2 violations on l-I-decisions is 
best explained by a strong correlation between the maxim and ‘artificial language 
use’. In Conversation 4, 95% of subjects who indicated that the computer used arti- 
ficial language, also believed that it violated QN2. Conversely, 80% of subjects who 
indicated a QN2 violation by the computer stated that its language use was artificial. 
The effect of language use being artificial, needless to say, prompted subjects to 
agree that the computer evealed the fact that it was a machine. 
When computers violate the maxim of QN2, they sound mechanical. Even 
humans can appear machine-like in TT settings when they violate QN2: An actual 
human being was mistaken for a computer program in the 1991 Loebner Contest 
because her knowledge of Shakespeare was too perfect. Care must be taken, there- 
fore, to avoid violations of QN2 in chatterbot design. This means that designers must 
come up with more refined ways of incorporating background knowledge into the 
conversations. Of course, since violations of QN are often related to violations of 
RL, this will not suffice in itself. But situations like Conversation 3, in which the 
computer is rather encyclopedic, must be avoided. 
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4.1.4. Quality 
Strong conclusions about QL could not be reached in this experiment because vio- 
lations of QL did not occur alone, but usually in conjunction with violations of QN, 
MN and especially RL. It is not possible to say whether the unfavorable impressions 
the computers caused when they said things that were wrong and things they did not 
have evidence for are due to violations of QL, or the violations of these other max- 
ims. Moreover, the maxim QL has to do with ethics and truth, which may not be as 
important in the human-computer conversations we studied as they are in other con- 
versational environments. 
4.2. Maxim violations as predictors of performance 
To explore further the relationship between maxim violations and performance 
judgments, we ran additional statistical tests on the results. In doing so, we collapsed 
the results across groups and studied all fourteen conversations used (of which eight 
are presented in this paper) as the data points. In previous analyses, we looked at dif- 
ferent conversations containing strong violations of one or more maxims. Here, we 
will consider the maxim violations in a continuum and explore their possible predic- 
tive relationships with performance. 
The results are summarized in Table 10. Here, we have taken the percentage of 
detected violations of the maxims in QMAX as the independent variables and tested 
them as candidate predictors of two performance measures obtained from QTTs. 
These two measures are human-like behavior (as measured by the percentage of sub- 
jects who agreed that the computer appeared human-like in QTT) and revealing 
machine-ness (as measured by the percentage of subjects who agreed that the com- 
puter revealed its identity in QTT). 
Taken independently, not all maxim violations are predictors of performance 
measures. MN and QL percentages reported in QMAX, taken alone, did not corre- 
late significantly with judgments on either human-like behavior or revealing 
machine-ness. Violations of MN correlate positively with human-like performance 
and negatively with revealing identity. However, the regression lines obtained fell 
short of significance and the effect sizes were not very large. This indicates that MN 
has a very reliable effect on performance measures in conversations where MN is 
very strongly violated (as seen in previous analyses), but the effect does not gener- 
alize as significantly to levels of agreement with violation. Regression analysis on 
QN taken independently revealed a stronger elationship, and this was significant for 
human-like behavior. RL, taken alone, correlated significantly with both measures of 
performance. Violations of RL have a negative effect on TT-performance. Thus, 
when maxims are considered independently, RL is the only maxim that significantly 
predicts both performance measures, QN and MN follow RL quite closely, and QL 
is very far from being a predictor of either measure. 
When RL and MN are taken together, they become rather good predictors of per- 
formance. For human-like behavior, the regression equation is significant and effect 
size is rather large. The equation reveals that RL and MN have different contribu- 
tions; RL has a negative impact and MN has a positive one (p=O.Ol, r2=0.6). For 
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Table 10 
Regression summary for human-like behavior and revealing machine-new 
Maxims Significance Effect 
Human-like behavior 
RL 
:z 
QL 
RL, MN 
RL, QN 
RL MN, QN 
ALL 
Revealing machine-ness 
RL 
:: 
QL 
RL, MN 
RL, QN 
RL, MN, QN 
ALL 
p=o.o2 
n.s. (p=O.l) 
p=o.o2 
n.s. @=0.6) 
p=O.Ol 
p=0.0001 
p=o.o02 
p=o.o05 
p=o.o5 
n.s. @=0.09) 
n.s. @=0.07) 
n.s. @=0.6) 
p=O.o2 
p=o.o2 
p=o.o2 
n.s. @=0.06) 
&0.4 1 
ns. 
1%X42 
:>.6 
&I.7 
kO.8 
r%.8 
?%I.31 
n.s. 
ns. 
ns. 
rz=O.5 
GO.5 
&0.6 
n.s. 
revealing machine-ness, the converse holds as expected with RL correlating posi- 
tively, MN correlating negatively. The regression is again significant and effect size 
is still large (p=O.O2, 9=0.52). RL and QN taken together yield a strong regression 
too. They both correlate negatively with human-like behavior (p=O.OOOl, r*=0.7) and 
positively with revealing machine-ness (p=O.O2, 13=0.5), reaching effect sizes that 
are even larger than those observed for RL and MN. 
When we used RL, MN, and QN in the regression, we saw that both performance 
measures were significantly predicted and effect size was very large. The RL, MN, 
and QN combination was the one that predicted both performance measures ignifi- 
cantly with the maximum effect size. 
Adding QL either led to no significant change, or lowered the predictive power of 
the set of maxims. When all maxims are taken together, regression is significant for 
human-like appearance (p=O.O05, ?=O.Sl). However, the regression for revealing 
machine-ness just falls short of significance @=0.06, r2=0.64). It must be noted that 
the contribution of QL to regression lines (the p-value for the intercept and coeffi- 
cient for QL) was always non-significant. 
Taken together, these results indicate negative correlations of RL and QN viola- 
tions with human-like behavior and positive correlations of these maxims with 
revealing machine-ness. The opposite is true of MN violations. RL and MN taken 
together or RL and QN taken together can predict both performance measures ig- 
nificantly. The best set of maxims to predict IT-performance are RL, MN, and QN. 
The slight differences observed between the two performance measures are indica- 
tive of the maxim violations operating differently in making different 
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For the human-like behavior measure, the effect sizes are larger, suggesting that the 
maxim violation framework is a very good predictor of judgments of human-like lan- 
guage use. This is interesting because it validates the hypothesis that humans make 
use of the conversational maxims in their assessment of behavior in this context. The 
other performance variable (revealing machine-ness) was not predicted as strongly by 
the maxim violations. This, we believe, is because there are factors other than con- 
versational maxim violations that subjects rely on when making their decisions. The 
contribution of QN and QL to judgments of revealing machine-ness measure are 
somewhat different from their contribution to the human-like behavior measure, indi- 
cating that the operation of these maxims may be slightly different during these judg- 
ments. However, many regressions are still significant and effect sizes still very 
large, which indicates that the CP and the maxims still are at play. This outcome 
supports the rest of our data analysis. 
4.3. On bias 
All subjects develop a stance towards the conversations and the participants dur- 
ing the first questionnaire that they take, which in turn, could have an impact upon 
their responses in the second questionnaire. The results indicate that this bias does 
not influence the direction of the results (i.e. whether people tend to detect a certain 
maxim violation or whether people think that the computer’s behavior was human- 
like vs. machine-like). However, the intensity of the agreements/disagreements is 
affected. 
Recall that Group A subjects make the ‘IT judgments after having read the con- 
versations while completing QMAX. This, in turn, makes them more familiar with 
the conversations than Group B subjects at the time they are asked to make the per- 
formance decisions. On the other hand, subjects in Group B have worked on the con- 
versations while completing QTT and therefore have focused mostly on the comput- 
ers’ performance prior to taking QMAX. 
Subjects in Group A displayed a tendency to give more extreme performance 
judgments. As we said above, both groups reply in the same direction. However, 
when the answer is positive (i.e., when the subjects believe the computer managed to 
appear human-like in the given excerpt), Group A’s results are always stronger. In 
other words, in such cases, they tend to be more tolerant of the computers. Con- 
versely, people in Group A also are stronger in their negative opinions. When the 
computer is thought to be revealing its identity, it was Group A people who were 
more stringent.3 
Let us first focus on Group A’s behavior. These people read the conversations 
fist without knowing that computers are involved. We are not saying that people do 
not detect communication problems in these conversations. However, the alternative 
‘This is a computer program’ does not seem to come to mind as an explanation for 
’ While the tendencies hold across conversations, only six out of the fourteen conversations revealed 
a statistically significant difference between response patterns of Group A and B subjects when taken 
individually. 
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the problems detected. Many subjects in Group A wrote comments on QMAX, some 
examples of which are provided below. 
I inferred that B is mentally retarded. 
B seems to be on drugs. 
A seems to be a confused person. 
B does not make any sense! Retarded? 
Are some of these people mentally ill? 
There is no conversation here. Both have had their brains fried. 
Rather than thinking the computer’s responses reveal that it is a machine, I think 
it gives the impression of being a seriously disturbed psychotic patient.4 
Group A subjects have read the conversations with no bias, reflected upon the 
anomalies in them, and have probably come up with explanations imilar to those 
listed in the example comments above. Thus when they find out that the reason for 
the abnormalities in the conversations they have worked on a few hours ago was the 
fact that one participant was a machine, they react more strongly. 
Interestingly, there is no noticeable difference between Group B’s detection of 
maxim violations by the computers and those of the subjects in Group A. However, 
they make noticeably fewer judgments on maxim violations by the humans in the 
conversations. Group B subjects already know that the experiment is about comput- 
ers by the time they complete QMAX. There are only 14 conversations and it is easy 
to remember which one is the computer. Moreover, even if they cannot remember, 
we believe they would have no trouble guessing which participant is the computer 
given that they know one of them must be. In due course, they do not pay too much 
attention to the humans in the process. The results of our analysis indicated that 
overall, Group B subjects detected human maxim violations significantly less than 
Group A subjects. This result generalizes to all maxims; paired t-tests for RL, MN, 
QN, and QL violation agreements for the humans in all 14 conversations are all sig- 
nificant at p-values of 0.01, 0.01, 0.03, and 0.01, respectively. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Cooperation revisited: Practical concerns in general human-computer commu- 
nication 
We propose the CP may need to be modified to accommodate the case of human- 
computer conversation. To what extent this should be done depends on whether we 
look at the issue from a practical or a theoretical viewpoint. 
Let us first look at how Grice introduces the CP: 
4 This comment was put on QTT by a Group A subject. Even after being told that one of the partici- 
pants is a computer, she feels this way. 
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“Our talk exchanges .. . are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative fforts; each partici- 
pant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or a set of purposes, or at least a mutually 
accepted irection. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g. by an initial proposal of a 
question or discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or may be so 
indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation).” (Grice, 
1975) 
After this, Grice introduces the CP as a general principle which the participants 
(ceteris paribus) are expected to observe. In conversations (those that are conducted 
by rational beings at least), the participants usually have some common aim and try 
to be aware of the conversational interests of the other. 
In the case that one or more of the participants is a computer, it is no longer pos- 
sible to talk about cooperation in the above sense. Perhaps we can talk about the imi- 
tation of cooperation, but we cannot really say that conversation programs of today 
really have an understanding (let alone a mutual understanding) of the direction of 
the conversations they are carrying out. 
On the other hand, although the computers in question may not possess intention- 
ality, we believe it might still make sense to want them to follow the CP. Consider 
an online help system that has a natural anguage interface through which people can 
ask questions to find out information about a particular company or product. It 
would be rather undesirable for this program to introduce irrelevant opics, behave in 
an obscure or uncommunicative manner, or say things that are false. Providing the 
adequate amount of information is not only appropriate behavior, but it is the reason 
for this program’s existence. In this case, we may say that the computer should be 
made to believe that it is an agent that needs to provide information on a certain 
topic and that this is its purpose in the conversations it will be engaged in. For such 
practical purposes, we believe the CP should not be violated by computers. 
This can be thought of as a general statement which merely happens to apply to 
computers in certain situations. This principle, which we will refer to as the Maxi- 
mization Principle or MP, can be formulated as follows: 
MP If you are in a situation which requires you to maximize the information to be 
communicated, abide by the CP (and the conversational maxims). 
The MP is a principle, not a rule. It is by no means definitive, i.e., there may be 
several other situations in which the CP should be followed. However, the MP is 
intuitive. In fact, it is really nothing new and is embodied by other principles in prag- 
matics, such as those of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Wilson and Sperber, 
1998) and rationality (Kasher, 1998). We formulate and use the MP for simplicity. 
Consider a job interview, an oral exam, an academic seminar, a court testimony. 
All of these are situations in which information is the central focus of the conversa- 
tions. It certainly would be odd if participants constantly refused to follow the CP; 
this would block information exchange, and clash with the interests of everyone 
involved. For example, it is unacceptable for an attorney to ask the witnesses irrele- 
vant questions during a cross-examination or for a PhD student o be rude to the fac- 
ulty members during her thesis defense. 
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Computer programs that can converse on restricted topics will probably prove to 
be easier to develop. However, we should always keep in mind that for best results, 
such programs should be made to follow the CP (because of the MP) and this is no 
easy feat. Useful dialogue systems have already been developed and we believe the 
quality of such systems will be rising rapidly in the near future. But we also believe 
that the initial excitement of having computer programs that can carry a conversation 
will eventually wear off. Then, we will be faced with having to produce better and 
better systems, and we will inevitably have to find ways of ‘making computers 
cooperate’. 
5.2. The i”T situation 
Let us recall the description of the TT. It is by no means a neutral conversational 
exchange. Turing explicitly describes the conversational interests of all parties 
involved. In the original game, we have a human judge (whose aim is to determine 
which of the two entities he/she is talking to is a woman), another human (whose 
aim is to convince the judge that he/she is a woman) and a computer (whose aim is 
to deceive the judge into believing that it is the woman). But the TT is usually under- 
stood to be a conversational setting in which there is a human judge (whose aim is 
to determine whether the entity he/she is talking to is a human being or a computer) 
and a computer (whose purpose is to convince the judge that it is a human). 
We have argued (Saygin, 1999; Saygin et al., 2000) that Turing’s original design 
(involving three participants and the gender issue) disguised methodological con- 
cerns, but conceded that the TT as is generally understood has become something 
else. Here, we will refer to the original gender-based game as TTG, and to the ‘IT as 
is commonly understood, with the human-computer decision made explicit, as TTH. 
Let us return to the CP. We have argued in Section 5.1 that in practical applica- 
tions of human-computer communication, computers are likely to be required to fol- 
low the CP and the conversational maxims and that the extent to which they should 
do this depends on what aims are to be attributed to the computers in question. Vari- 
ants of the TT come with predefined purposes for all parties involved. The purpose 
of the judge varies from scenario to scenario; in the ‘M’H he/she is trying to deter- 
mine the species of the participant(s), in the TTG he/she is set on identifying the 
gender of the participant(s). It must be noted that when the gender issue is involved, 
we are assuming (as in the TTG described by Turing) the judge has no knowledge 
about computers being involved. He/she is focused on determining the gender of 
his/her conversational partners. Therefore, the gender based scenarios are but a way 
of looking at the IT situations in which the judge has no ‘prejudice’ based on know- 
ing that computers are participating in the game. 
Let us recall the differences observed between the survey results of Group A and 
Group B. The results indicated that those who had read the conversations without 
any knowledge about the possibility of one of the participants being a computer were 
more reactive in their decisions on whether the computer’s behavior was human-like 
or machine-like. These people had read the conversations for the first time while 
they were taking QMAX and probably most of them did not suspect hat computers 
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were involved. Therefore, when they took QTT later, they were more appreciative 
when computers appeared human-like and less tolerant when they acted in ways that 
revealed their machine-ness. 
Having read the conversations only once, without any bias, prior to being asked to 
make decisions regarding how human-like the computers’ behavior was seems to 
have an effect on people’s judgments. Imagine the situation if judges were not told 
about computers at all. TTG scenarios and TTH scenarios differ in this very impor- 
tant aspect. The judges in ‘ITH scenarios will inadvertently be influenced by their 
prior beliefs and assumptions about computers. The effect of ‘knowing vs. not know- 
ing’ may not be fully deterministic in TT situations but both intuition and the survey 
results indicate that the bias usually works against he computers. 
Maxim violations may give rise to implicatures in conversations. Most of this 
process relies on the hearer’s assumption that the speaker is following the CP, or at 
least that the speaker is a rational being. In TTH situations, this ceases to be the case. 
When judges are faced with anomalies in conversation, they will tend to think these 
are caused by their conversational partner’s identity, i.e., by the fact that it is a 
machine. They will not bother to work out any implicatures. It must be apparent hat 
this can cause a great difference in how the CP and the conversational maxims work 
in such settings. TTH judges will always take the easy way out: they can say ‘this is 
a computer’ and move on. With the judge having this choice to fall back upon when 
there is something that needs to be resolved, can we really say that the computers are 
getting a ‘fair hearing’? If we wish to grant intelligence to computers by subjecting 
them to a ‘IT-like test, we should at least try to give them a fair shot at it. In human- 
human conversations we try to resolve things in every way we can before conclud- 
ing that the speaker is mentally retarded or on drugs. The same should apply to 
human-computer conversation. 
However, this is not an issue that can be solved easily for TTH scenarios. We will 
eventually ask the judges to make a judgment on the human-ness vs. machine-ness 
of the entities they converse with. 
Then, in TTH situations the best strategy for computers would be to not violate 
any maxims, or do so in a human manner. The latter is too difficult to view as a real- 
istic goal in natural language chatterbot design at this moment, considering how lit- 
tle is formalized about the way humans violate and interpret maxims. On the other 
hand, computer programs that abide by the CP and never violate any of the conver- 
sational maxims at any time are liable to appear overly mechanical in ‘IT settings. 
However, both the survey results and intuition dictates that they should at least be 
able to handle the maxim RL, and preferably QN. 
And of course, we always have the original TTG. The pragmatic framework of 
Grice is affected to a lesser extent in these situations. The judges will not carry any 
bias against the computers. The implicature resolution process will work as before, 
with the judges trying to exploit violated maxims in order to make something out of 
what the participants ay. A disadvantage may be that they will focus on trying to 
find clues that will reveal the gender of the speaker(s). This may distract the judges 
from other (linguistic) phenomena that can occur in the conversations. However, we 
do not think we should take this seriously if we do not have practical concerns like 
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those outlined in Section 5.1. We wish to repeat our argument for TTGs here. Say- 
gin et al. (2000) have argued that gender based games were more fair and exhibited 
sound experimental design since the woman, whether as a concept or in reality, 
served as a sort of neutral point so that the impostors could be assessed in their abil- 
ity to deceive. Now, we can add to this the pragmatic concerns described above. 
‘ITGs are immune to the bias that knowledge of computer participation may bring. 
They allow the interrogators to work out conversational maxims (and in general, 
exercise their naive psychology) the way they normally do. If we are interested in 
the ‘IT as a philosophical concept, we should definitely consider TTG situations as 
viable (maybe even better) alternatives to TTH situations. At first, it may be absurd 
to think that being capable of deception has anything to do with humanness. But in 
fact, there are many other things we take for granted in this manner that have a lot 
to do with being human; we hope that looking at pragmatics has revealed some of 
those. Even if we define the ‘IT’s aims in purely operational terms, the TTG scenario 
provides an alternative, since it allows the competence of computers to be assessed 
in a manner that is fair and unbiased. 
5.3. Cooperation revisited: The lT situation 
Section 5.1 mentioned how and why the CP should apply to human-computer 
communication systems that are practical, real-life applications. Now, we comment 
on the CP and the conversational maxims in ‘IT situations. 
Note that the MP need not apply in TT situations. Some judges may be focused 
and serious, asking specific questions and demanding to-the-point answers 
(although, as was mentioned before, such judges are encountered rarely), while oth- 
ers are rather relaxed and chatty. In general, TTs do not require the computers to 
strictly follow the CP and the conversational maxims. Although we will not consider 
the philosophical implications of this, a computer program that successfully imitates 
a whimsical, rude, elusive, or otherwise uncooperative human is, in theory, able to 
pass the ‘IT. If a certain kind of human-like linguistic behavior is consistently pre- 
sent in interactions with a computer program, there really is no way of denying that 
it has passed the TT just because it does not follow the CP. 
As we saw in the survey, sometimes maxim violations can create a human-like 
effect. In fact, strong violations of MN have invariably created favorable impres- 
sions. It can be inferred that, had the programs that used being rude or obscure as a 
‘strategy’ been more successfully designed to handle the syntactic components of 
natural language, they would have appeared quite close to human beings, albeit 
strange ones. If in addition to this, the semantic processing had included ways to par- 
tially handle relevance and quantity, some of these might even have passed the 
‘Loebner Test’. 
On the other hand, it is by no means the case that computers can violate the max- 
ims freely and still manage to appear human-like. Recall that the results of our 
regression analyses between performance evaluations and maxim violations are not 
only significant, but also have very large effect sizes. This shows that people implic- 
itly or explicitly make use of pragmatic information while making these judgments. 
A.P. Saygin, I. Cicekli I Journal of Pragtnatics 34 (2002) 227-258 255 
More specifically, we showed in this study that maxim violations predict people’s 
judgments on the behavior of computers reliably and significantly. These results 
should not be ignored by computational linguists who are interested in developing 
models of linguistic behavior, as the findings indicate that the failure to handle some 
pragmatic aspects of language (e.g., the failure to make computers abide by the max- 
ims of RL and QN) could be to blame for unsuccessful attempts at making machines 
use language in a natural and human-like manner. 
Violating RL is usually indicative of poor semantic processing on the computer’s 
part and violating QN (especially QN2) creates a rather artificial effect most of the 
time. QL does not seem to be as important as it is in inter-human conversations or in 
practical applications of human-computer conversations. The truth vs. falsity of the 
computers’ contributions to the conversations are usually not of extreme importance 
in ‘JT scenarios. As we have mentioned before, violations of QL that we encountered 
in human-computer conversations were generally not isolated cases; they frequently 
occurred along with violations of one or more of the other maxims. The cases in 
which QL is violated but the rest of the maxims are not (i.e., the contribution is rele- 
vant, not more or less informative than required and is delivered in an appropriate 
manner) should be considered ethical situations. To give an example, suppose a com- 
puter is asked, ‘Where does Michael Jackson live?‘. The answer ‘Somewhere in Cal- 
ifornia’ violates QN but is not revealing of the computer’s identity. According to 
Grice’s analysis, in such cases a human would violate QN because of a clash between 
two maxims. Providing more information would violate QL which is of a higher pri- 
ority. We do not believe this applies to TT situations. An answer of the sort ‘Michael 
Jackson lives in Tulsa, Oklahoma’ would be just as acceptable. Not everyone has to 
know where Michael Jackson lives. Maybe providing false information is not an 
ideal kind of behavior in our society, but we think extending this to computers and 
expecting them to be not only human-like, but also ‘ethical’ seems rather frivolous. 
6. Conclusion 
Despite advances in language modeling, the pragmatic analysis carried out here 
has revealed that programs designed to pass the TT have not yet performed satisfac- 
torily with respect to pragmatics. 
Our study is a first attempt o characterize the pragmatics of human-computer 
conversations. These results not only have implications for future modeling work, 
but also shed light on how humans judge conversations with computers. We also 
believe that some of these results generalize to multi-purpose human-computer con- 
versations and even computer-mediated conversations in general. Moreover, the pre- 
sent work emphasizes once again that pragmatics is a crucial component of linguis- 
tic communication. Although this is a widely acknowledged fact among pragmatics 
researchers, other scientists and writers, notably computer scientists, sometimes tend 
to underestimate how hard the problem of pragmatic modeling can be. 
Although no computer program has passed the TT so far, recent advances in nat- 
ural language processing are by no means negligible. Since 1991, annual TT contests 
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have been held and prizes given to programs which display the most human-like 
conversational behavior. Natural language conversation systems can be found corre- 
sponding with humans on web pages, providing information on specific topics, prod- 
ucts or companies, talking in chatrooms, and playing MUD (multi-user domain) 
games. As text and speech processing advances rapidly, it can be expected that we 
will have more and more computer applications which have natural language com- 
munication components. There is ample evidence indicating that we will soon be 
regarding computers as ‘language users’. It will therefore be necessary to extend 
existing theories of conversation in order to accommodate computers as participants. 
Studying human behavior during conversations with computers under different con- 
ditions will also be an interesting and relevant line of research in pragmatics. 
Recently, there has been a lot of action in some areas such as computer-mediated 
communication, discourse analysis in electronic environments, and human-computer 
interaction. It must be borne in mind that human-computer conversation is not only 
about the computer’s performance. The human participants’ beliefs, aims, prejudices 
and behavior are all contributing factors. In discussing human-computer conversa- 
tion, we will need to be concerned with several issues that do not lie within the 
domain of syntax or semantics: the stance of humans towards computers, the beliefs 
of the humans about the identity of their partner and the aim of the conversation, and 
the settings in which the exchange takes place, to name a few. With human-com- 
puter conversation rapidly becoming reality, it is time we paid more attention to the 
humans conversing with these computers, not solely on parsing methods and knowl- 
edge bases. Several things need to be considered here, such as anthropomorphism, 
and people’s dispositions, expectations, and behavior in cybernetic environments. 
If, for any reason, we want computers to use language in a human-like manner, it 
is only natural that we are interested in how their behavior fits (or could be made to 
fit) existing frameworks concerning conversation. In our work, we have focused on 
how humans react to computers’ maxim violations in human-computer conversa- 
tions. The results of the experiment we carried out indicate, among other things, that 
Grice’s CP is at work during conversations with computers. However, there are dif- 
ferences between how the CP applies to inter-human conversations and the findings 
reported in this paper (e.g., the differential contribution of MN violations and the 
lack of effect of QL violations). Thus, new theories and frameworks, or at least a 
modification of existing ones, may be needed in studying human-computer conver- 
sation as well as all computer-mediated conversation. Some of these differences may 
be due to humans’ expectations from their conversational partners in electronic envi- 
ronments, while others may have their roots in their expectations from computers. 
While our focus has been on Grice’s conversational maxims, the work may be 
extended to cover other pragmatic aspects of human-computer conversation. 
Having analyzed how humans behave in conversations with computers, we want 
to briefly consider some ideas that can immediately be applied to conversation sys- 
tem design. Although it seems that we have a long way to go before we can suc- 
cessfully model human conversational behavior, we do not need to solve all of the 
mysteries of linguistic pragmatics before we start working on developing better 
conversation systems. Our study indicates that the most important maxims to avoid 
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violating in IT situations are relevance and quantity. If performance with respect to 
these two maxims can be improved, this would have a very favorable effect on con- 
versation planning. 
We do not believe that pragmatics will constitute an extra module to model sepa- 
rately, but rather that it should be developed in conjunction with a semantics com- 
p0nent.j Some pragmatic phenomena can be incorporated into the semantic analysis 
component. For instance, conventional implicatures can be treated exactly the way 
semantic ontent is handled. Detection of changes of subject and keeping track of the 
current topic can be incorporated into the semantic processing by using a context- 
sensitive approach. Once the computer is given means to follow the current direction 
of the conversation, it will be less likely to violate the maxims of relevance and 
quantity in ways that are not human-like. We are not saying that all problems will be 
solved, but we believe results in handling at least the maxims of relevance and quan- 
tity could be obtained by a combination of existing techniques in AI and NLP. 
We think the pragmatic concerns we have raised in this paper should be kept in 
mind in chatterbot design and that ways to handle them will start becoming more and 
more apparent. 
Although conversation agents that can pass the IT may have limited practical use, 
natural language conversation systems have many applications. As computerized 
automation of various aspects of daily life becomes more and more commonplace, 
we will be having more and more conversations with computers. Although this work 
has discussed human-computer conversation mostly within the ‘IT framework, we 
have also mentioned why more practical NLP applications hould also try to model 
certain aspects of pragmatics. 
On the other hand, most of the work in this paper concerning pragmatics and 
computer use of language is admittedly premature. Conversation programs of today 
are far from being linguistically competent. Some Loebner Prize contestants cannot 
even perform simple syntactic parsing and generation of grammatical responses. 
Most have little or no semantic processing capabilities. Pragmatics isn’t even on the 
agenda yet. But still, we hope we have managed to convey that there is much more 
to language modeling than a first look might suggest. Pragmatics constitutes a seri- 
ous challenge for artificial intelligence researchers. Developing a computer program 
that knows how to be relevant, how to provide the correct amount of information in 
a given context, how to make appropriate jokes, how to use appropriate metaphors, 
allusions, figures of speech, how to behave in a given situation and in general, how 
to ‘cooperate’ in conversation will be no simple achievement. 
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